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Abstract
Since the transition to democracy, court delay has been a powerful signifier of the problem of the criminal justice in Argentina. This has been the case particularly in the Province of Buenos Aires where court delay was constantly projected by the Provincial Government’s narrative as evidence of injustice and/or inefficiency in the system. It has been the focus of sustained political attacks upon judges, defence lawyers and public prosecutors by members of the national and provincial parliaments of Argentina. These narratives of court delay have enabled a number of reforms in the criminal justice system, which has reshaped organisational practices to the extent of constituting a new and different strategy of producing justice. This article identifies, describes and makes sense of those discourses and practices, and the strategies and tactics behind them by analysing the governmental narrative and the judicial and organisational reforms.
Introduction
In Argentina since its transition to democracy in the early 1980s, the problem of court delay has become a powerful signifier of the problem of justice itself.​[1]​ 
This has particularly been the case in the Argentinean Province of Buenos Aires – from now on PBA – where court delay has been constantly projected as evidence of injustice and/or inefficiency in the system paving the way to a number of reforms in the last two decades.
As this article will show, the issue of court delay has been a key issue in a major prison riot in 1996, and 10 years later in a hunger strike involving 14,000 prisoners. It has been at the centre of the Federal and Provincial Government’s narrative and has also been the focus of sustained political attacks upon judges, defence lawyers and public prosecutors.

I. The political economy of court delay

Court delay has been a traditional subject of socio-legal studies. In the Latin American context there has been a number of socio-legal studies that have sought to identify the causes of and to propose solutions to eradicate court delay  ADDIN EN.CITE [3-7] or even to define when one could talk about delay. [8] Though most of these studies focus on civil and commercial courts there is an increasing number of studies carried out or order by organisations sponsoring judicial reforms over Latin America such as CEJA.​[2]​ 
However, this article takes a different approach to court delay taking the political context in which those reforms took place seriously. It argues that to understand court delay is necessary to look closely at how the different groups –inside and outside the state– have promoted or hampered criminal justice reforms over the last two decades.
Moreover, it also argues that the particular way criminal justice currently works can only be understood by analysing how and why court delay has acquired such a relevance in the governmental narrative and what kind of reforms in the criminal justice has this narrative promoted.
Therefore, this article begins by exploring the apparent contradiction of the Government’s narrative on court delay when sustaining two opposite discourses: a discourse of due process that depicts court delay as infringing defendants’ human rights and a punitive discourse that regards court delay as ultimately resulting in impunity. 
Stigler has analysed how political actors mobilise the state’s regulatory power to their own benefit. [9] Following Stigler’s approach, this article will show that groups inside the state (the governor and senior officials, representatives, judges, prosecutors, public defence attorneys) and outside the state (detainees, rights and left wing activists) have recurred to the discourse of court delay to impose reforms onto the criminal justice system in their interest. 
At the same time, the article shows that the government’s narrative took a managerial direction by subsuming both the problems of lack of public safety and defendants’ human rights infringements into the problem of court delay. Progressively more explicit reforms sought to direct and control judicial actors’ behaviour.
This conflict between the government and judicial actors can be understood as a principal-agent problem. [10] Whereas the government is the principal, judicial actors are the agents. The government seeks judicial actors to act in its best interest. However, it is difficult for the government to verify on what grounds the judicial actors are actually taking their decision. Therefore, there is always some possibility that the judicial actors are not acting in the government’s best interest. So, in order to re-direct their decisions towards the government’s objective –which in this case it means to solve cases fast– the reforms re-allocated decision rights (by shifting power from judges to prosecutors) and changed incentives (by implementing probation, plea bargaining, pre-trial hearings, etc.).
In this way, these reforms have given more control and direction over the criminal justice to the provincial government. However, these reforms have also implied a less obvious change: the displacement of the juridical rationality (in the process of criminal cases) in favour of an economical one. 


II. Court delay matters
2.1 Debates on the National Congress: shaping court delay as a problem
Argentina is a federal country in which a federal criminal justice coexists with independent provincial criminal justices organised by each province. 
This article focus on the criminal justice of PBA, the largest and most populated province in which almost 40% of the Argentinean population lives. However, governmental discourses and reforms that shaped how court delay was understood first emerged at the federal level.
In 1983 the first democratic elections were held in Argentina after a period under military dictatorship. After decades of democratic governments interrupted by military coup d’état, Argentina entered into an enduring democratic period.
The attempts to reform the criminal justice began with the bill to reform the Federal Criminal Procedure Code (from now on CPC) presented by the Government at the National Congress in 1987. The bill was finally rejected but three years later a new Government presented another proposed law to reform of the Federal CPC. 
The new Federal CPC was passed in 1991 after a series of long debates in the National Congress between August 1990 and July 1991. Those debates revolved around the replacement of the old inquisitorial Federal CPC with an accusatorial based CPC. ​[3]​ The main argument brought by legislators to support the procedural system shift was court delay. 
Legislators claimed that citizens had lost their trust in criminal justice because of its inefficiency publicly exposed by pervasive court delay. [12pp. 2524, 2525,13p. 2548,14p. 1634] This inefficiency was considered from two opposite perspectives. On the one hand, the Government’s narrative argued for the position of defendants waiting for their trial. According to the Government, court delay was the cause of violation of human rights of the defendants who have to wait in prison for their trial and consequently this caused prison overpopulation.  On the other hand, court delay was brought as a cause of lack of public safety because it led to closing criminal cases before reaching a sentence and therefore resulted in impunity.
This duality in the Government’s narrative had a double effect. First, by associating court delay with prison overpopulation and lack of public safety, it was positioned as a central problem to be dealt with. Secondly, the duality of the narrative on court delay allowed mobilising both human rights advocates as well as supporters of tough crime policies around this problem.
The same discursive strategy was followed in the discussions years later over the introduction of the ‘suspensión de juicio a prueba’, a local version of probation​[4]​ and the ‘2x1’ law​[5]​, a law aimed at reducing prison length by compensating long pre-trial detention. So, the Government justified the proposal of the ‘suspensión de juicio a prueba’ law by arguing it will relieve criminal justice bottleneck.  The whole debate around the ‘2x1’ law revolved how court delay caused prison overpopulation with legislators from the opposition complaining the ‘2x1’ was not aimed at solving the problem of court delay but only its effects - meaning prison overpopulation-.[15p. 1290,16p. 2269]

Even when these laws were discussed at federal level, they did not only set how court delay was to be thought through their debates but they also reformed the Criminal Code which is valid nationwide, thus having direct impact at the Provincial level. 

2.2. Court delay in the criminal Justice of the PBA
In 1996 a violent riot broke up in the Sierra Chica prison in the PBA. The riot was caused by a serious prison’s overpopulation in which 66% of them were detainees either waiting for their trial or waiting for a response of their appeal against their conviction.​[6]​ [17p. 82] After the riot was controlled the senior Government member charged with negotiations with the prisoners announced that her office had already been working on a bill to reform the CPC that would solve the problem of court delay so as to dramatically shorten the time detainees had to wait in pre-trial detention before appearing in court. [18] 
In line with those declarations a key Senator declared in the debate of the mentioned CPC in the Provincial Congress that:
 ‘…Justice is not real Justice if it does not pass on judgments fast. (…) [a]nd Justice is not real Justice if we do not give the detainee at least some basic guarantees because until he has been sentenced he is innocent …’. [19p. 3238]
At the same time, the Government’s memo accompanying the bill to reform the CPC sustained the importance that the main objective of the new procedural law was to reduce ‘court delay [that results in impunity]’ because criminal justice fails to punish criminals. [20]
The new CPC of PBA was passed and the Provincial Government’s narrative kept invoking court delay to explain prison overpopulation and lack of public safety. [21]
Example of this is the response of the Governor in 2004 to a citizens’ rally demanding tough-on-crime policies. The Governor sent a reform of the criminal justice to the Congress which its new measures ‘were basically aimed to speed up criminal processes, to obtain faster sentences and to prevent releases [of pre-trial detainees]’. [22]
Likewise, three years later, the same Governor –responding to concerns of human rights violations of prisoners waiting for their trial– said that ‘criminal justice must be faster … [because] there are too many people detained in an endless criminal process’. [23]
To sum up, a good example of how the Provincial Government’s narrative managed to articulate those two claims on court delay – its link with prison overpopulation, human rights’ violations, and lack of public safety– is the declaration of Governor Solá, who arguing for a reform of the criminal justice of PBA, said that, 
‘the [Criminal] Justice has collapsed (…) [we] have to finish with judges programming debates in five-year time, with innocents detained in prisons [waiting for their trial], and with recidivists who because they don’t have a final sentence are released on bail and then again they commit another crime’. [24]
The Provincial Government’s narrative, continuing the narrative set at the Federal level, managed to place court delay at the centre of debate. In that way it was said that to solve prison overpopulation, violations of detainee’s rights and the lack of public safety it was necessary to deal with court delay. But at the same time it meant that whoever was responsible for court delay was also responsible for prison overpopulation, violations of detainee’s rights and the lack of public safety. 
In the next section, it will be analysed how that discourse was developed and how it paved the way for reforms inside PBA’s criminal justice.
III. Intervening criminal justice
In spite of the importance given by the Government’s narrative to court delay, no research was conducted neither by the Federal nor by the Provincial Governments on the problem. The diagnostic and solutions that the Government’s narrative sustained were focused on the legal framework.
That situation changed with the emergence of CEJA. The CEJA promoted a more sophisticated diagnosis and solution that combined legal and organisational perspectives. More importantly, CEJA insisted on the importance the local particularities. Thus it sponsored a series of research on the criminal justice of PBA with great emphasis on efficiency and particularly on court delay. It was significant that CEJA chose the Centre of Legal and Social Studies (CELS), a well-known local human rights NGO to carry out the first research in 2003. [25] Like the previous Government’s narrative, CEJA’s discourse of efficiency was presented as human rights’ discourse.
At that time, the Provincial Government shifted its discourse on court delay towards a more managerial discourse.
CEJA designed a pilot programme of reforms for the PBA’s criminal justice that was tested in one judicial department in 2005. The programme was so successful that it was later extended to the rest of the criminal justice’s departments. It also carried out two more studies in 2005 and 2007 that documented the process of implementation of reforms proposed by CEJA and evaluated the resistance these found and the general impact of the reforms. [26,27]
The next sections will show how the Government’s narrative and techniques introduced a managerial rationality that shift the focus from the individual case to the case flow. It also introduced spaces of freedom for legal actors to allow them to process cases in a more economic way. In this way public prosecutors and judges’ productivity began to be taken into account.

3.1 The procedural system
The reform of the procedural system was the first response to deal with court delay. As it has been previously mentioned, the reform of the Provincial CPC took place in 1996. The precedents that set the discourse on the procedural system were the debates and reforms made at the Federal level on the Federal CPC in 1987 and 1991.​[7]​ 
The discourse of reformers, who were lawyers, defined the old Federal CPC as inquisitorial and promoted the moved towards more accusatorial procedural systems. They argued that accusatorial systems were more efficient and respectful of defendants’ rights.
The Government’s narrative reproduced the reformers’ discourse to sustain its proposition of reform in 1987 but failed to obtain the National Congress support. 
The failure in 1987 led the next Government to present in 1990 a less radical reform that introduced public oral trials but kept a judge in charge of the investigation and the prosecution. In the debate of this reform, Government and legislators claimed that public oral trials would eradicate court delay [12pp. 2522, 2528, 2529, 2531,13pp. 2553, 2556, 2892, 3039,14p. 1624] and at the same time they would improve both public accountability[14p. 1623,13p. 3040] and respect of defendant’s rights[13p. 2892]. As a Senator arguing in favour the public oral trials of the new Federal CPC in 1990 said: 
‘[Public oral trial by] assuring public accountability, immediacy and celerity, it will eradicate current delay in courts, which is not attributable (…) to judges, but to the present [process] system that has caused the current situation despite the praiseworthy effort that members of the judiciary show [in their work]’ [13p. 2550].
Meanwhile, the criminal justice of PBA remained with its ‘inquisitorial’ structure with the sole introduction of public oral trials in 1987 for very exceptional cases.​[8]​
As it has been mentioned before, the violent riot in the Sierra Chica prison in April 1996 propelled the reform of the Provincial CPC. According to the senior officer in charge of presenting the new CPC, it was to be ‘essentially accusatorial allowing for greater immediacy and celerity’[18]. A month later the Executive power presented the new bill to reform the CPC to the Provincial Congress stating in an accompanying memo that the key problem of prison overpopulation was ‘congestion of criminal files, slowness when processing those files and the subsequent delay in passing sentences’[20]. Reproducing the arguments of the Federal Government around public oral trials, the memo accompanying the bill to reform the CPC of PBA by the Provincial Executive Power  stated, it ‘will gradually implement an accusatorial oral procedure to [be able to] judge with neither delay nor infringement of citizens’ individual guarantees’[20]. But, in contrast with the federal debate it went further into an accusatorial system and stated, ‘the prosecution in charge of public prosecutors, the preliminary hearings, the plea bargaining and the probation will make possible to speed up criminal process…’ [20] In the old system the criminal judge led the investigation and also the trial. In the new CPC public prosecutors are both in charge of the preliminary investigation and of bringing the defendant to trial whereas judges are relegated into a more passive role of controlling the respect of due process.
In 1998 when the new CPC was finally put into operation, two years after being passed, the Government’s narrative shifted from blaming the inquisitorial system to the appeal system for court delay. Facing criticism for the slowness of criminal justice, the General Attorney stated that even when the new CPC was aimed at speeding criminal process up, the extent of the appeal system generated delay and bureaucracy. So, he demanded for a ‘deepening of the accusatorial system, giving more power to the public prosecutors to investigate without so many formalities to fulfil and to remove from the CPC everything that delays trials’[28].
This association of inquisitorial systems and court delay was spread all over Latin America by a network of reformers [11p. 618,29]. This network successfully lobbied reforms that replaced the old criminal procedural codes with accusatorial based ones. Such reforms were carried on in Bolivia (1999), Chile (2000), Colombia (1992-2004), Costa Rica (1996), Dominican Republic (2002), El Salvador (1997), Guatemala (1992), Honduras (1999), Nicaragua (2001), Paraguay (1998), Peru (2004), Venezuela (1998), and some provinces of Argentina and states of Mexico. [11p. 631]
Therefore, the experience of the Province of Buenos Aires described here was hardly unique, quite the contrary it was result of a regional tendency. For example, if we look at the Venezuelan experience, Perdomo has shown how legislators justified the replacement of the inquisitorial code arguing similar reasons to those provided in the case of the Province of Buenos Aires, i.e. that the accusatorial system would bring a “fast justice” with a “sense of equity” that would “combat criminality” imposing “juridical security”.[2p. 23] 
Moreover, as it happened in the Province of Buenos Aires, the introduction of the accusatorial system included not only the public oral trial and the delegation of the criminal investigation in the public prosecutor but also the introduction of plea-bargaining mechanisms. 
Already in 1998 before the newly approved Venezuelan criminal procedure code was implemented, Perdomo questioned, that an accusatorial system would eradicate delay. Nevertheless, he was confident that plea bargaining mechanisms could effectively reduce delay.
However, such as in the case of the Province of Buenos Aires, according to Delgado, six years after the implementation of the new Venezuelan criminal code, judicial practices only fulfilled the new principles formally (in some cases not even formally) and court delay persisted.[30]

In the American justice system (the model the new Latin American accusatorial codes are based on including the one introduced in the Province of Buenos Aires) had long ago relegated the public oral trial to a symbolic place as judicial actors chose to solve most cases by different bargaining mechanisms.[31] So, it is not surprising that in 2004 the Provincial Government proposed another reform of the CPC to extent the bargaining chances by giving further discretionary powers to public prosecutors and introducing a special expedite criminal process for cases in which the defendant is caught red-handed.
In both cases, the Provincial Government’s narrative and the reforms that followed focused on the investigation phase of the criminal procedure, seeking to simplify it while empowering public prosecutors all in the name of celerity. The gap between both periods, 1998 and 2004, can be explained by the unprecedented socio-economic crisis leading to riots all over the nation in 2001. During those years the criminal justice, and the whole Provincial Justice, suffered harsh budget restrictions to the point that basic office supplies such printer toner cartridges or even paper for official documents were lacking.[32]
However, legal reforms did not have the expected impact in practice, which led the Governor to publicly complain about the attitude of judicial actors opposing changes. [33] So, in order to face this resistance a new different approach was taken which consisted of focusing on the organisational culture and working practices instead of modifying the legal framework, i.e. CPC.[34p.  13] This approach was promoted by CEJA. 
In December 2004 the CEJA began a pilot programme in the Province of Buenos Aires. By that time, the CEJA had already carried on studies in several countries of Latin America evaluating the impact of the criminal procedure reforms. According to the CEJA’s evaluation there was a consistent pattern of failure to achieve the goals of the reforms in different Latin American criminal justices, particularly the replacement of written procedures with oral hearings and the eradication of court delay. [35]
From the experiences observed, the CEJA developed a series of mechanisms, such as the multipurpose oral hearings to improve efficiency by encouraging judicial actors  to find a solution in the early stages of the criminal procedure.[36,34] 
Perhaps, more importantly, the CEJA took the decision of managing the process of reforms by itself. They promoted the model of progressive implementation of judicial reforms applied in Chile. So, the reforms were implemented in a group of judicial departments and progressively extended to more departments. After this successful experience, reforms such as the one of Peru and of the Province of Buenos Aires followed that model.​[9]​ 
In the case of the Province of Buenos Aires, the CEJA began by selecting  a group of judicial civil servants from a single judicial department to develop – with the technical aid of judicial reform’s experts – working practices to put into practice the expedite criminal processes for cases in which the defendant was caught red-handed. [26pp. 259-260] The experience was considered successful and the programme was gradually implemented in the rest of the Provincial criminal justice. [27p.  27]
Perhaps the most innovative characteristic of the programme was the introduction of pre-trial hearings –whose content was not previously defined– in which judicial actors were encouraged to find an early solution for the case. Even when these solutions – plea bargaining, probation, mediation, filing the case – were not new, the programme emphasised the mandatory presence of all judicial actors and the defendant in those hearings, i.e. public prosecutor, defence lawyer and judge. To ensure those pre-trial hearings took place, the programme introduced a complete new office in the criminal justice organisation called hearings’ management office – O.G.A. due to its initials in Spanish. The OGA was in charge of hearings coordination.[26p. 260] Its main functions were to administer the use judges made of the hearing room; to keep the hearings agenda of public prosecutors, public defence lawyers and even the Police whenever the defendant was in detention to assure defendant’s presence.[27p. 183] The OGA not only coordinated the hearings but also kept records of whether the hearings were actually carried out, suspended or cancelled and of the hearings’ results.[27] In this way the OGA made possible to evaluate Courts’, public prosecutors’ and public defence lawyers’ working performance and by doing so the managerial logic irrupted in a domain where previously only the juridical logic was expressly accepted. The declarations of the Governor of PBA in December 2006 illustrates how the Provincial Government’s narrative fully adopted the managerial language concerning criminal justice, 
‘We want summary trials with a restructuration of the System so that the appeals are much more limited and to have a deep permanent change in the methods for organising and administering the judicial work in the criminal justice’[38]
The CEJA’s programme broke the traditional juridical logic by showing that working practices could be changed without changing the legal framework, putting into perspective law’s weight in the criminal justice outcome.
The ‘agency theory’ [10] approach helps to understand the rationality behind CEJA’s programme. Pre-trial hearings can be regarded as a space where judicial actors have an unusual freedom inside the criminal procedure. The hearings are not heavily regulated allowing judicial actors to follow their own strategy on the case. However, both incentives and evaluations drive them to find an early solution, the most economic for them and the system. The control of hearing results by OGA plays a vital role in this. But also, perhaps more decisively, mandatory presence of judicial actors at the hearings means each judicial actor’s behaviour affects the rest of them. Thus, the hearings drive judicial actors to constantly balance between their own interests and the others’. In tension with this tendency to conciliate positions, the freedom of judicial actors to decide how to deal with the case leads to increase the individual’s responsibility for the outcome. In that sense, the result of the case seems to be more the result of the judicial actors’ strategy than before when it looked as law’s imposition. 

3.2 Defence Lawyers
Federal and Provincial Government’s discourses blaming defence lawyers for court delay emerged with the debate of the ‘2x1’ law in 1994 and continued criticising the defence’s strategies until the law was abrogated in 2001. 
The ‘2x1’ law aimed at dealing with two problems. In the international front, Argentina violated article 7.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (from now on ACHR) that established the right of detainees to have a trial within a reasonable time.​[10]​ At the same time, in the internal front, prisons were overpopulated with 66% of prisoners in the PBA waiting for their trial.[17p. 82] The prison situation was so tense that a series of prison riots broke out to pressure legislators to pass the law.[39p. 2658] 
The ‘2x1’ aimed at limiting the pre-trial prison to two years, however, the Federal Government could only modify the Federal CPC. To overcome this limitation, besides limiting pre-trial prison in the Federal criminal justice the law modified the Criminal Code which was valid nationwide. [40p. 5418]  This reform of the Criminal Code, affecting equally all the Provincial criminal justices, stated that after having spent two years in pre-trial prison days would be counted double.
This mechanism was criticised by legislators from the opposition because they claimed that it opened the way to cause court delay as a defence strategy.  The fear was, as a Senator from the opposition explained, that defendants would obstruct the proceedings to produce court delay so they would be released before their trial. [16p. 2274] These concerns led to include a provision that allowed judges to discount the time delaying actions from the defence might have taken.[39p.  2657]
The ‘2x1’ law remained at the centre of the debates over lack of security in the following years. But, with the election in December 1999 of a new Governor in PBA that publicly supported tough-on-crime policies the criticisms over ‘2x1’ law gain momentum.[41,42] The new Provincial Government took up again the discourse that claimed defendants took advantage of the ‘2x1’ law provisions intentionally producing delay in their criminal process by constantly appealing against court resolutions. According to the Government the strategy was to appeal even if there was no solid ground of appeal in order to prevent the sentence to be considered final. By keeping the sentence appealed the defendant remained legally innocent so the time the whole appeal process took – up to years sometimes - was considered served in pre-trial prison.​[11]​ Because of the effect of the ‘2x1’ law all that time the defendant remain detained was counted double.
Furthermore, according to the Provincial Government the defence strategy caused not only delay because postponing the end of the proceedings by appealing the sentence but also by doing so it produced delay in the High Court of appeals because of the increased caseload.
The Provincial Government also claimed that the defence strategy prevented criminal justice of punishing criminals since criminal sentences were diluted by the combination of the time served in pre-trial prison that was counted double.[43]
The political campaign, also heavily supported by the media, managed to obtain the abrogation of the ‘2x1’ law.​[12]​ However, the problem of prison overpopulation with a majority of prisoners waiting for their trial that gave birth to the ‘2x1’ did not fundamentally change. This was evidenced by the hunger strike held by 14,000 prisoners in September 2006 demanding to re-enact the ‘2x1’ law.
However, similar criticisms on defence strategies allegedly using the appeal system to prevent sentences to be considered final emerged years later. In December 2006 a defendant who had already been found guilty of three murders was released on bail. In that case, the defence lawyer had strategically appealed his client’s sentence so that he remained legally innocent and therefore under pre-trial detention. Then he asked to be released on bail taking into account the long time he had been detained. The case became so notorious that the President of Argentina publicly criticised the criminal court for its decision. The Governor responded by presenting a bill to reform the criminal justice which blaming defence strategies for delay sought to reduce appeal’s possibilities; he stated that:
‘in the new [criminal procedure] law I am proposing (…) there will be two levels [trial courts and appeals courts], not three neither four [levels of appeals], enough of delaying tactics to postpone trials forever (…) Do you know the number of delaying tactics that defence attorneys have?’ [47] 
Later, the Minister of Justice of PBA confirmed that from the Provincial Government’s perspective the problem was that ‘every sentence can be reviewed several times [and] [t]hat is what causes [court] delay.’[48]
But, the Government’s attempt clashed with the judiciary because of the intention to dissolute the High Court of Appeals. Judges of the High Court of Appeals carried out a successful lobby campaign in the Provincial Congress thwarting the Governor’s reform. 
Perhaps the Federal and Provincial Government’s approach towards defence strategies causing court delay illustrates best the contradictions, complexities of and resistances to governmental interventions. While the ‘2x1’ law responded to a need to solve an urgent governmental problem, i.e. the prison situation, it also sought to indirectly pressure courts by forcing them to either improve their efficiency or liberate detainees. Thus, court’s inefficiency when punishing criminals was meant to be made visible so they could be made responsible for the lack of public safety.
However, the ‘2x1’ law neither eradicated court delay nor made courts responsible. Conversely, the ‘2x1’ law itself and the Government which enacted it were blamed for the lack of public safety this law created. The Government then managed to abrogate the ‘2x1’ law and to introduce restrictions in the appeal regime but not without great difficulties. The obstacles placed by the judiciary, especially the Judges from the High Court of Appeals, were the possible infringement of the guarantee of due process, especially protected by the ACHR, and the threat of prison riots like the ones of 1996 or 2006.  

3.3 Judges 
The Federal Government was reluctant to blame judges for court delay. Only some legislators at the polemic ‘2x1’ law’s debate addressed a few harsh comments towards judges. However, those criticisms seemed to seek to make them responsible for the law they were dealing with rather than opening a discussion on how to intervene in their work.[39pp. 2656, 2662]
The Government’s reluctance could be attributed to the liberal principle of judicial independence recognised in the National Constitution as well as in the Constitution of the PBA prevents the Executive Power to interfere with judges’ decisions.[49,50] In order to protect judicial independence a series of mechanisms exists, most notably the permanent tenant of judges. ​[13]​ As this section will show this judicial independence was an obstacle for the Provincial Government’s repeated attempts to introduce either control measures or incentives to judges’ productivity. 
The move from an inquisitorial procedural system to an accusatorial one meant public prosecutors to be empowered in detriment of judges. However, the reformers discourse replicated by the Provincial Government identifying the inquisitorial system with the authoritarian Argentinean past made difficult to argue against the move towards the accusatorial one.
Even when there had been some criticisms by senior members of the Provincial Government to judges [51], they were rather exceptional. However, when Felipe Sóla became Governor in February 2002 he engaged in a persistent campaign to introduce some control over judges’ performance.
His first proposal to introduce evaluations of judge’s competence every five years sparked a strong reaction from the Supreme Court of PBA because it was understood as a challenge to the constitutionally protected permanent tenure of judges.[52] The judge’s resistance was forceful; and two years later, the Governor was still campaigning for the reforms to be passed by the Provincial Congress. On that occasion he stated that, 
‘…judges should be evaluated on their productivity, on the work they have done. There should exist a system of punishment and rewards for the excellent judges but also for the bad ones.’[53] 
The tension between the Governor and the judiciary raised again after the Governor managed to get pass a series of reforms including the introduction of expedite trials for cases where the defendant was caught red-handed, the extension of Misdemeanour Courts competence (Juzgados Correccionales) over more serious crimes and establishing that Criminal Courts should receive petitions 24 hours a day. The Supreme Court of PBA with support from the Association of Judges reacted by demanding the creation of 38 new courts to be able to carry out those reforms. The Governor responded, 
‘Demands for more money have to be connected firstly to a [previous] study to know how many hours do [people in] the Judicial Power work, [secondly] to know what their performance is, what the level of control over those who work well is and over those who don’t, and [thirdly] [to know] who are productive in the judicial service’ [54]
Two years later, in September 2006, the Provincial Government used the hunger strike of 14,000 prisoners to support its campaign to control judges’ productivity. Prisoners complained for the time they have to be detained waiting for their trial and demanded to re-enact a mechanism to compensate that time like the one the ‘2x1’ had. When negotiating with prisoners, the Minister of Justice of the PBA attributed delay to criminal judges and promised prisoners to audit criminal courts to evaluate the amount of backlog and its causes.[55] However, a general reform of the criminal justice the Provincial Government tried to pass two months later was thwarted in the Provincial Senate thanks to the lobby of the judiciary.[56]
The Governor kept pushing for a reform that introduced some kind of evaluation of judges’ performance. Despite trying to obtain consensus for his reforms by moving to a more technical managerial discourse avoiding direct accusations to judges of court delay, [57] he was unsuccessful. But his efforts were not in vain because once he left office, the newly elected Governor managed to get most of his reforms passed. The new Governor avoided to publicly clash with the judiciary and stated that the idea of the reform ‘was not to punish judges but to help them, to give them more tools to work.’[58] However, his Minister of Justice said that the ‘idea [of the Government] is to sanction the lack of productivity attributed to the judge’s indolence or negligence’. He added that apart from the introduction of a regime of sanctions he was planning to create hearing management units in each judicial department so that they can fix courts’ agenda according to a ‘rational and objective criteria.’[59] During 2008, in just one year, the new Governor succeeded in getting reforms enacted which included a further implementation of expedite trials, creation of OGAs (see section 3.1), six-months mandatory period for judges to pass sentence, to split for the majority of offences criminal tribunals composed of three judges into individual courts, to restrict the decisions and cases that can be appealed, to impose mandatory periods for the High Court of Appeal to respond appeals and to extent the cases that could end by plea barging.[60]

In conclusion, after more than six years of struggling the Provincial Government finally managed to introduce some control to judges’ performance. However, the judiciary resistance – built around the judicial independence and the life tenure it guarantees– prevented the Government to impose any tighter control or stronger sanctions.​[14]​ 

3.4 Public prosecutors
With the move towards an accusatorial based procedural system in the reform of the CPC of the PBA in 1998 public prosecutors gained much power. However, a year after the new CPC was implemented the performance of public prosecutors was severely questioned by the Provincial Government. In December 1999 it was elected a new Governor who had campaigned for tough-on-crime policies. His new Minister of Justice declared he was worried about the poor performance of the criminal justice. He said he was critical of the new CPC and threatened to restore to the old CPC unless ‘public prosecutors showed him that they could carry out their task.’[62] This generated protests among public prosecutors resulting in a meeting between the General Attorney, head of the Ministerio Público (MP) the organisation of which public prosecutors and public defence lawyers are members, and the Minister. After the meeting, the General Attorney said that ‘[they both] agreed on the need to reform the Code to give the prosecutor the possibility to perform their task in a more efficient way.’[63] These reforms were in fact 
‘to deepen the accusatorial system by giving more freedom to the prosecutor to investigate by removing currently required formalities and by removing from the Code everything that produced delay in bringing cases to trial’.[63]
This sequence of Provincial Government’s criticisms to public prosecutors –followed by a reform that gave them more power– was replicated in July 2003. In that occasion while the Governor criticised public prosecutors by demanding “[a] faster justice (…) and more engagement of public prosecutors and more convictions’ [64] at the same he modified the criminal justice system with an executive decree allowing them to authorise raids without a warrant order from the court.​[15]​
And in the next year, two reforms of the CPC gave to public prosecutors more discretional power so instead of being forced to prosecute all cases they could decide considering the seriousness of the offense or the progress of the investigation whether to bring a case to trial or to early drop it.​[16]​ 
That same year, in August 2004 Ms. Falbo former Undersecretary of Justice and main sponsored of the CPC’s reform in 1996 was appointed as General Attorney. Her openly accepted political profile, and the fact she had never worked inside the judicial organisation meant a break with past practices. In her first official statement she said she was ‘aim[ing] at reorganising the office, speeding up Justice, and supporting personnel training’, indicating her focus was on managerial reforms rather than juridical.[65]
The importance of Ms. Falbo’s appointment was such because the Ministerio Publico has hierarchical structure in which public prosecutors must follow the general policies enacted by the General Attorney. Through these general policies she managed to impose reforms that the Provincial Government had previously tried to impose through laws’ reforms and failed. An example of this is the introduction of expedite trials for defendants caught red-handed. Because expedite trials implied judges, public prosecutors and defence lawyers to work more intensively they resisted the implementation. A criminal case to be treated as a expedite trial needed to be required to the judge by the public prosecutor. In the practice public prosecutors did not require it, and in the cases which they did so judges would refuse the expedite trial procedure. That resistance was overcome by reforming the law so it became only a public prosecutors’ decision whether to treat a case under the expedite trial procedure or not.​[17]​ Then, a general policy enacted by the Ms. Falbo ordered public prosecutors to treat cases under the expedite trial procedure as a rule and to justify when they consider expedite trial is not appropriate for a case.​[18]​
In this way, Ms.Falbo allowed the Provincial Government for a greater degree of control over their performance or at least she facilitated to channel the Government’s demands to public prosecutors.
Other examples of this mechanism could be when Ms. Falbo pushed public prosecutors to actively seek close criminal processes by recurring to plea bargaining or the ‘suspensión de juicio a prueba’ in order to avoid court delay.​[19]​ 
Furthermore, Ms. Falbo introduced an Information System which allowed her to ‘see’ and keep track in ‘real time’ of the work done by public prosecutors on criminal processes.[66]
In sum, public prosecutors were empowered in detriment of judges by giving them freedom to decide whether to prosecute a case or not and how to do it. At the same time through the organisation they belong they were controlled in their performance by their superior, the General Attorney, and were ordered to follow certain policies. 
This combination of more freedom to act and a centralised control sought to make individuals responsible for their decisions while exerting control over them through their performance outcome.[67]
It is important to point out that the centrality of public prosecutors and their organisation (the Ministerio Público) is not singular to the case of the Province of Buenos Aires. In this article, it has been argued that the political relevance of the head of Ministerio Público made the Provincial Government to rely on public prosecutors to promote the reforms. However, it should be noted that the Ministerio Público has been a leading actor in the reform process not only in this case but in the rest of Latin American countries as well. [68]
This can be explained by the evident relevance that public prosecutors acquired by the replacement of inquisitorial systems with accusatorial ones. Their importance is also related to their previous weakness. In fact, all over Latin America the Ministerio Público used to be a very small and unimportant organisation of the criminal justice. That lack of previous power and tradition gave it an extended flexibility (in comparison with the judiciary) to adopt new working practices based on a managerial rationality. 
A clear example of how the Ministerio Público has led the introduction of a managerial rationality is the case of Bolivia. Assessed by the USAID, the Ministerio Público of Bolivia has been innovated by the introduction of a “unit of immediate reaction” and an “office of assistance to victims”. The “unit of immediate reaction” is responsible for filtering the new cases, discriminating the cases that can be solved by alternative mechanisms such as mediation and rejecting those that have no grounds to be followed. The office of assistance to victims besides giving them juridical counselling promotes conciliation mechanisms, so it also helps to reduce the number of cases the system has to deal with.[69]





This article aimed to show through a detailed political historical analysis: 1) how the political strategies behind the governmental narrative on court delay reduced the discussion of the effects of its social and security policies - such as prison overpopulation and the lack of public safety- to the problem of criminal justice’s inefficiency; 2) how that governmental narrative paved the way to a series of programmes and interventions that transformed its criminal justice system. Those reforms went from the juridical modernisation of the criminal procedure in the 1990s to the introduction of management techniques in the last decade.
The analysis, based on Stigler’s approach [9], has shown that these political strategies, programmes and reforms have suffered resistances from different groups, both inside and outside the state’s apparatus. These groups have tried to impose their particular political programmes which were based on diverse rationalities. 

As a consequence, judges have fought strongly against some of these reforms lobbying in the Provincial Congress for years to thwart them. Even when they may not have stopped them, they did shape them or limit their extension.
Another form of resistance was the appropriation of court delay discourse by prisoners in the riots of 1996 and the hunger strike of 2006 to channel their claims for a shorter criminal process but also for better conditions of detention.
Perhaps the most powerful resistance was the strategic use and production of court delay by defence lawyers to favour their clients. 

However, delimiting the problem of the criminal justice around court delay has led the actual selection, implementation and adaptation of reforms to share a managerial logic. 
Thus, public prosecutors were empowered in detriment of judges and enjoyed wide discretionary powers to handle criminal cases. However, public prosecutors were under a constant scrutiny by their superior, the General Attorney and had to follow her criminal policy. 

Finally, the managerial direction these reforms deeply affected the way criminal justice enforces criminal law. So, reforms displaced the trial –traditionally the ultimately symbolic technology of state justice– by multiplying the ways of dealing with a case and therefore the meaning of what to deliver justice is. The government strategy is no longer to punish ‘every’ crime committed; instead its strategy is to control crime flow by selecting what to prosecute and to what extent, seeking to maintain acceptable crime rates.[67] This is the new economy of power that has required moulding criminal justice’s internal organisation to make it more flexible and adaptable to governmental crime policies. But also the system covers the governmental decision in the policies since these are materialised as judicial actors’ individual decisions in the criminal process.
However, it would be a mistake to understand this change in the state’s strategy towards crime as a part of a neoliberal retreat of the state’s agenda. On the contrary, as Lemke argues, ‘the state in the neo-liberal model not only retains its traditional functions, but also takes on new tasks and functions.’ [72] The official recognition of the state’s criminal justice’s limitations seeks to be more effective in its interventions rather than to withdraw.  A proof of this is that parallel with this restructuration, the criminal justice of PBA has notably expanded its human and material resources.​[20]​ Furthermore, this process of reforms inside the criminal justice system has reinforced the state authority by enabling the Provincial Government to reassert central control over it.
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^1	  In Latin America criminal justice has been the object of comprehensive reforms in the process of transition to the rule of law in the last decades. Court delay has not been an exclusive problem of Argentina; on the contrary court delay has been a widespread problem in criminal justice all over Latin America for decades and reforms have been carried out in the criminal justice of other Latin American countries expressly aiming at reducing it. [1,2pp. 19-43] 
^2	  CEJA is the acronym in Spanish for Justice Studies Centre of the Americas, an agency of the Inter-American system which promotes criminal justice reforms all over Latin America
^3	  Langer explains that in Latin America reformers and politicians have described ‘a move towards accusatorial systems’ to: the introduction of oral public trials; the introduction and/or strengthening of the office of the public prosecutor and the decision to put the public prosecutor instead of the Judge in charge of the pre-trial investigation; giving defendants more rights at the pre-trial phase; introducing the principle of prosecutorial discretion; allowing for plea bargaining and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and expanding the victim’s role and protection during the criminal process [11p. 618].
^4	  In fact the Government stated in the preliminary recitals of the law that introduced the ‘suspensión del juicio a prueba’ that it was based on the diversion rather than the probation. The difference between the probation and the diversion is that while in the probation sentence is suspended in diversion the criminal process itself is suspended before reaching trial [15p. 1289]. However, in Argentina the ‘suspensión del juicio a prueba’ has been known as probation.
^5	  The law n. 24,390 is popularly known as the ‘2x1’ law because of the way it counts double pre-trial prison days. 
^6	  The situation of Buenos Aires’ prisons, i.e. overpopulation with a majority of detainees waiting for their trial, could be found at that given time in most Latin American’s prisons. [17]
^7	  In 1984 the newly elected president Alfonsín ordered a commission to design a new CPC. The bill was presented at the National Congress in 1987. However, the bill was not approved that year and finally lost its chance with the drain of power of Alfonsín’s Government. In 1990, under the presidency of Menem, a new proposed law to reform the CPC was presented at the Congress called Levene Code. The bill was in fact one which had been presented in 1975 by the Peronist Party which had not been approved because of the problematic political situation. The Maier’s reform of the CPC of 1986 meant a more revolutionary change to an accusatorial based Criminal process than the Levene’s reform of CPC that was finally passed [11p. 641].
^8	  The reform of 1987 restricted public oral trials to a small number of offenses, the most serious ones. Even in those cases it was the right of the defendant to decide whether to be have an oral trial or not.
^9	  Salas Beteta describes the process of criminal procedure reforms in Peru. [37]
^10	  Article 7.5 of the ACHR says, ‘Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings’. 
^11	  The defendant in a criminal process is legally considered to be innocent until a final sentence declares him guilty. However, a sentence is not considered final until every possibility of appeal has been exhausted.
^12	  See for e.g.  ADDIN EN.CITE  ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA [44-46]
^13	  See art. 176 Constitution of PBA
^14	  The comparison between the criminal procedure reform of the Province of Buenos Aires and the one carried out in Chile makes it possible to identify the singularities of each case. In both cases there was resistance to criminal procedure reforms from the part of the judiciary. However, the difference was precisely the political response to such resistance. In the Chilean case, the judiciary tried to thwart the reform through a legal interpretation of the Supreme Court that deactivated the process of replacing written procedures with oral hearing. The Government acted fast and strong mobilizing the whole political forces, and enacted a new law forcing an interpretation of the regulation that backed the process of reforms. [61] The Provincial Government of Buenos Aires never had such political will or force to impose the procedure reform, as a consequence, the judiciary resistance shaped the reforms.  
^15	  Executive decree  n. 1111
^16	  Laws n. 13,183 and 13,260
^17	  Decisions n. 369/08 and 279/09
^18	  Law n. 13,943
^19	  Decisions n. 472/04 and 529/06
^20	  The same expansion of the state’s judicial system with the declared aim to democratise it can be found in Zunino’s description of Guatemala transition [73].
